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BOOK REVIEW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY,
Amnesty International, London: Amnesty International
Publications. 1987. Pp. vi + 245. Softbound. $6.00.
Reviewed by Timothy J. Foley*
I.
In an eight week period between June 7 and July 30, 1987, the
state of Louisiana electrocuted seven men.1 Elsewhere in the South,
during the same period, four other executions occurred.' Eleven
years after the death penalty was reinstated by the United States
Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia' and its companion cases,' the
South appears well on its way to resuming a pace of executions not
rivaled since the early 1950s,' with the rest of the nation not far
behind.
In 1985, in response to this country's reinstatement of the death
penalty, an Amnesty International mission visited Florida, Georgia,
© 1988 by Timothy J. Foley
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1. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., DEATH Row, U.S.A. (August
1, 1987) (on file at the Santa Clara Law Review office).
2. Two executions occurred in Texas, one in Virginia and one in Mississippi. Id.
3. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
4. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
5. Extrapolating from the June/July 1987 figures, executions may soon be occurring at
a rate of over sixty per year in the South alone. The last calendar year in which the total
number of executions in the country was this high was in 1955. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY 207 (1987) [hereinafter AMNESTY RE-
PORT]. From 1930 to 1939, there were 1,667 executions in the United States. The use of
executions began a slow decline in the 1940's, when 1,284 prisoners were executed. The an-
nual nationwide total dipped below 100 for the first time in 1950, below 50 for the first timein 1958. By the late 19 60's, the moratorium, broken only in the last few years, had begun. Id.
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Texas and Louisiana to meet with officials, visit prisons and discuss
capital punishment issues with lawyers. 6 Amnesty International is
an independent organization, based in London and composed of
members around the world, dedicated to the protection of human
rights, the release of prisoners of conscience, and the prohibition of
torture and other degrading punishments.7 Opposition to the death
penalty is one of the organization's fundamental tenets.'
United States of America: The Death Penalty (Amnesty Report)
published in January, 1987, 9 is a collection of the conclusions drawn
from the 1985 mission supplemented by additional, more recent data.
It represents a welcome gathering of information regarding the use
of the death penalty in the 1980's in the United States. The moral,
legal and economic debates over the means and manner of capital
punishment have now passed from the theoretical to the real. The
Amnesty volume recognizes this fact, and argues that the "new"
post-Furman v. Georgia'0 system has failed to provide minimum
fairness in the selection of those who die. Ironically, this volume
made its appearance only months before the United States Supreme
Court conceded, when faced with similar findings, that "[a]pparent
disparities" in the capital selection process are "inevitable."'"
II.
Some general comments will be helpful prior to the discussion
of the contents of the Amnesty Report. First, Amnesty's bias is not
hidden and must be recognized. The organization "opposes the death
penalty unconditionally, believing it to be the ultimate cruel, inhu-
man and degrading punishment and a violation of the right to
life. . . . "1 Unsurprisingly, this position handicaps much of the
analysis. When a debator's premise and conclusion are the same, the
logic of the arguments has a surface attractiveness but suffers from
6. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
7. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 241-43.
8. Amnesty has become increasingly involved in capital punishment issues since the late
1970's. In 1979, Amnesty published a report on the death penalty around the world. AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY (1979). Since 1980, Amnesty has concentrated its
anti-death penalty efforts on seven nations: China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, South Africa
and the Soviet Union. In February, 1987, in conjunction with the publication of the report on
the death penalty in the United States, the United States became the target of a full-scale
Amnesty campaign against the death penalty. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1987, at A17, col.
9. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5.
10. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
11. McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1777 (1987).
12. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
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the weaknesses of a self-rationalizing approach.
The volume apparently has two purposes: it is both a report on
the death penalty in America and a manifesto for the abolitionist
movement. The duality of purpose and the occasional inconsistency
between these two objectives leads to some problems. The arguments
of death penalty advocates, for example, are used mainly as spring-
boards for more persuasive counter-arguments and are rarely
presented as viable positions."3 Nonetheless, the Amnesty approach,
by refusing to disguise its bias, invites critical review, displaying a
confidence in the logic of and basis for its conclusions.
Any single volume review of the death penalty in America
must, of necessity, be limited to selective issues, and this one is no
exception.' 4 The Amnesty Report leapfrogs through a variety of top-
ics, coming to rest in some unusual areas. However, given the slim-
ness of the volume, it provides a good overview of a very broad topic.
The volume would benefit, however, from a more structured and co-
herent organization. After the introductory chapters, the topics seem
almost randomly selected and ordered.
The volume begins with a summary of recent historical back-
ground: the roots of the abolitionist movement, the convergence of
forces that produced Furman' and the subsequent reinstatement of
the death penalty.' 6 The background material is supplemented with
a seven page synopsis of the basic procedural law of capital punish-
ment.17 As a mere seven page summary of an extremely complex
area, this chapter is admirable. In addition, the breadth of the Am-
nesty Report is apparent from the discussions concerning the involve-
ment of mental health professionals in the capital punishment pro-
cess and the international standards relating to the death penalty."8
The primary value of the Amnesty Report is in its focus upon
the recent application of the death penalty. With almost 100 execu-
13. Note the discussion in chapter 13 regarding the General Arguments for and
Against the Death Penalty. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 162-77. This section amounts
to little more than a checklist of the central arguments in the debate over the death penalty. Its
scope is very limited and the conclusions predictable. Compare H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY IN AMERICA (3d ed. 1982); E. VAN DEN HAAG AND J. CONRAD, THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY: A DEBATE (1983).
14. See generally H. BEDAU, supra note 13; J. GORECKI, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
(1983); T. SELLIN, THE PENALTY OF DEATH (1980).
15. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
16. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 9-18.
17. See AMNESTY REPORT, sUpra note 5, at 19-26.
18. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 139, 178 (chapters 10 and 14 respectively).
Unfortunately, both these areas are discussed in a far too cursory fashion. Less brevity would
have resulted in a more informative presentation.
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tions in the past ten years, the use of capital punishment has re-
turned as a reality in the United States. The debate over the role of
the death penalty in our system is no longer merely theoretical. Am-
nesty's contribution is to this new debate, rooted in the reality of
modern capital punishment.
Three areas discussed in the Amnesty Report are particularly
sobering in light of the re-emergence of the death penalty. First, the
report sets forth the studies that have shown invidious racism in the
choice of the death-deserving defendant, despite the efforts of the
courts to eliminate this factor. Second, the report indicates that the
use of the death penalty on those that our society traditionally con-
siders as less culpable - juveniles and the mentally ill - seems
destined to continue. Third, the case studies delineated by Amnesty
indicate that capital punishment continues to be applied in an arbi-
trary and capricious manner.
In his Furman concurrence, Justice William 0. Douglas la-
mented the undercurrent of racism in the history of capital punish-
ment in this country, noting that standardless sentencing discretion
was "pregnant with discrimination." 9 Amnesty returns to this area,
finding that the fifteen years since Furman have brought us no
closer to a race-neutral system.20
In the early 1980's, Professor David Baldus conducted and su-
pervised a detailed analysis of racial faciors in death sentencing in
Georgia (the Baldus Study). Applying 230 control factors to over
2000 homicide cases, the Baldus Study statistically verified that indi-
viduals who kill whites are much more likely to receive a death sen-
tence than those who kill blacks. In the mid-range of aggravated
cases, for example, the study found that an offender in a white-vic-
tim murder was twenty percent more likely to receive a death sen-
tence than a similarly situated black-victim defendant. 2 Earlier,
during the late 1970's, a study conducted by William Bowers and
Glenn Pierce using data from four states22 found that black-defend-
ant/white-victim homicide was five to forty times more likely to re-
ceive the death sentence than a white-defendant/black-victim homi-
19. 408 U.S. at 257.
20. Much of the information used in Amnesty's discussion of the racial factors was gath-
ered from the data presented in the McCleskey federal habeas litigation. See AMNESTY RE-
PORT, supra note 5, at 54-64; McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1763-64; McCleskey v. Kemp, 753
F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985).
21. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 57-59. The Baldus Study also found evi-
dence that black defendants were more likely to receive death sentences than white defendants,
although the statistical verification of this finding was slim. Id. at 59.
22. Florida, Georgia, Texas and Ohio. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 59.
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cide.2" These studies reveal, at the very least, the disturbing fact that
the race of the victim, as much or more than any other factor, affects
the sentencing determination. Worse, the studies indicate that the
undercurrent of racism that has haunted the entire history of capital
punishment in this nation is still strong.24
The second area that should give one pause is the continuing
selection of juveniles and mentally ill individuals for the death sen-
tence. As of August 1, 1987, thirty-five inmates who were under
eighteen at the time of their offense were under sentence of death in
the United States.2 5 This total, of course, does not include Charles
Rumbaugh, Jay Pinkerton and James Terry Roach, all of whom
were age seventeen when arrested and who were executed in 1985-
86 in Texas and South Carolina.26 Further, the selection of children
for the death penalty is not limited to the South: Paula Cooper, a
sixteen-year old at the time of her offense, was given the death sen-
tence in Indiana; Joseph Aulisio, fifteen, was condemned in Pennsyl-
vania; Wayne Thompson, fifteen, was sentenced to death in
Oklahoma.2" Thompson v. Oklahoma, involving a challenge to the
constitutionality of the death sentence on juveniles, is currently pend-
ing before the United States Supreme Court.2"
Putting aside the legal question of the constitutionality of con-
demning minors, ethical questions remain. Certainly, juveniles can
commit heinous murders, but it is almost universally accepted that a
child is less morally culpable for his or her acts than an adult. 9 If
capital punishment is to be used as society's ultimate sanction, its use
must turn not upon the heinousness of the act alone but on the moral
23. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 55-56. See Bowers and Pierce, Arbitrari-
ness and Discrimination under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563,
595 (1980).
24. Justice Brennan, dissenting in McCleskey, reviewed some of Georgia's disturbing
history, including the statutory delineations between crimes committed by blacks and whites.
For example, the 1861 Georgia Penal Code contained a three tiered system of sentencing for
rape: rape of a black woman was punished by fine or imprisonment, rape of a white woman
by a white man was punished by a prison term of two to twenty years; and rape of a white
woman by a black man was punished by death. 107 S. Ct. at 1786.
25. Death Row, supra note 1.
26. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 203, 205.
27. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 75.
28. 724 P.2d 780 (Okla. 1986), cert granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987).
29. As Amnesty has documented, numerous international covenants condemn the use of
the death penalty on the underaged; and the practice of sentencing juveniles to death, even in
death penalty retentionist nations, has all but died out, except in the United States. See AM-
NESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 73, 178; Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic
Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CtN.
L. REV. 655 (1983).
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culpability of the defendant. Consequently, its use on children is
disturbing.
The execution of the mentally ill and the mentally retarded also
conflicts with the premise, central to the purported viability of capi-
tal punishment, that the death sentence should be reserved for the
most culpable. The Amnesty Report traces the cases of five con-
demned men who suffered from a severely debilitating mental illness
and yet received death sentences. These included the cases of Morris
Mason, a paranoid schizophrenic with an IQ of sixty six, executed
by Virginia in 1985, and David Funchess, an honored Vietnam vet-
eran who suffered severe post-traumatic stress disorder, executed by
Florida in 1986. 80
Third, Amnesty recites in its case-by-case descriptions the most
glaring examples of the lottery that the death penalty has become.
John Young, for example, executed in 1985, was represented at trial
by counsel who admitted to a complete failure to investigate mitigat-
ing evidence, who failed to put on any penalty phase trial, and who
was disbarred and convicted of drug charges after the trial. When
Young's federal habeas counsel amassed this evidence, and offered it
in combination with significant, previously unconsidered mitigation,
the federal courts refused to grant a new trial. 1
Other cases are equally troubling. Doyle Skillern was executed
in 1986 only a short time before his accomplice - the triggerman -
was eligible for parole.3 ' Robert Wayne Williams, executed in 1983,
had a trial lawyer who spent a total of eight hours preparing his
case.3  Morris Mason, the paranoid schizophrenic, was denied the
assistance of a defense psychiatrist in evaluating his sanity at his
trial. Ironically, three months before his execution and, as the courts
held, too late to save him, the United States Supreme Court declared,
in another case,8 that such a denial was a violation of fundamental
rights.3 5
Faced with these case examples, the continued condemnation of
juveniles and the mentally ill, and the statistical evidence of racial
motivation in sentencing, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that
30. How Ford v. Wainwright will affect this type of case is as yet unclear. Ford held
that: (1) the execution of the presently insane violates the eighth amendment and (2) states
must construct adequate and reliable procedures for determination of competence for execu-
tion. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
31. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 46-47.
32. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 52.
33. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 44.
34. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
35. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 82-83.
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the system is not operating as it should. As Amnesty states: "There
must be serious doubts about the fairness and effectiveness of the
criminal justice system when race, place, social class or chance con-
sistently play a larger part in determining a death sentence than the
facts of the crime or the character and circumstances of the
defendant." 6
III.
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court overturned Georgia's
death penalty statute, and effectively invalidated all existing capital
sentencing statutes.3 No majority opinion delineated the common
rationale for this holding, 8 but Furman came to mean that the
death penalty cannot "be imposed under sentencing procedures that
creat[e] a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner." '89 As Justice White, arguably the swing
vote in Furman, phrased it, the state must have a "meaningful basis
for distinguishing the few cases in which [death] is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not."4
This theme has consistently appeared in the Court's illumina-
tion of the "constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply [the] law
in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the
death penalty.""' Simply put, the ultimate penalty of death must be
"imposed fairly and with reasonable consistency, or not at all.'
The Amnesty Report presents significant evidence that this ob-jective has not been met. Nor is Amnesty alone: other sources have
indicated that death sentences in the modern era are no less capri-
cious than they were prior to Furman. In McCleskey v. Kemp,44
decided in April, 1987, three months after the Amnesty Report was
issued, the United States Supreme Court rejected the claim that sta-
36. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 53.
37. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
38. The five justice majority wrote five concurring opinions. Id.
39. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
40. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313.
41. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980).
42. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
43. See, e.g., Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition
of the Death Penalty in the 1980's, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 797 (1986); Hub-
bard, Reasonable Levels of Arbitrariness in Sentencing Patterns: A. Tragic Perspective on
Capital Punishment, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1113 (1985); Paternoster, Prosecutorial Discre-
tion in Requesting the Death Penalty: A Case of Victim Based Discrimination, 18 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 437 (1984); Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908
(1982).
44. 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
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tistical evidence of invidious discrimination entitled Warren McCles-
key, a black man who had been convicted of killing a white police
officer, to a death sentence reversal. In supporting this decision, Jus-
tice Powell, writing for a slim five justice majority, stated that
"[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our
criminal justice system." '45
In the early eighties, McCleskey became the lead case in the lat-
est wave of statistical challenges to capital punishment. Marshalling
the Baldus Study and other evidence, McCleskey's counsel demon-
strated significant disparities in sentencing based upon the race of
the victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant. McCles-
key claimed that these disparities represented a violation of equal
protection and offended the central eighth amendment reliability re-
quirements of capital sentencing.4
The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected McCleskey's
claims in 1985 by a nine to three margin. Judge Clark, one of the
three dissenters, commented: "To allow this system to stand is to
concede that in a certain number of cases, the consideration of race
will be a factor in the decision whether to impose the death
penalty."' 7
The Supreme Court majority, in affirming the circuit court,
seems to concede precisely this point. Rejecting the eighth amend-
ment claim, Justice Powell notes that a "permissible range of discre-
tion" in capital sentencing is not only necessary for the particular-
ized consideration of the individual defendant, but is intrinsic to a
system that is rooted in jury participation and prosecutorial discre-
tion."8 The system, in essence, "has its weaknesses" and its "imper-
fections,"'" but for five justices, the evidence brought by McCleskey
failed to demonstrate a "constitutionally significant" risk of
discrimination.50
Two observations aid in understanding the McCleskey Court's
45. Id. at 1777.
46. Id. at 1770.
47. McCleskey, 753 F.2d 877, 927 (l1th Cir. 1985) (Clark, J., dissenting). See AM-
NESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 61 (discussion of circuit dissents). Judge Clark's comment is
mistakenly attributed by Amnesty to Judge Hatchett.
48. McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1774.
49. Id. at 1788.
50. Id. One commentator reacted to the McCleskey holding with the following: "It is not
difficult to summarize the Court's decision in this case. It recognizes the racial discrimination
inherent in the Georgia capital punishment system, but does not consider any remedial action
necessary or appropriate. This opinion is a national tragedy." Bernstein, Supreme Court Re-
view, TRIAL, Sept. 1987, at 100.
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apparent acceptance of systemic racial motivation in capital
sentencing.
First, the McCleskey opinion is another example of the schizo-
phrenic nature of modern capital punishment jurisprudence. By si-
multaneously embracing the requirements of uniformity and individ-
uality, the Court finds itself attempting to reconcile two inconsistent
goals.61 The Court has struck down automatic death sentencing stat-
utes on the grounds that they deny individualized consideration of
the defendant " while demanding adherence to the consistency and
reliability necessary to avoid arbitrary infliction of capital sentenc-
ing." The McCleskey majority perpetuates the assumption that these
two goals are reconcilable: Justice Powell writes in terms of a mini-
mum requirement of discretion within a rational, narrowing process
of selection." Indeed, the "balance" between "a high degree of uni-
formity" and "the necessity for the exercise of discretion" is "essen-
tial" to "the Anglo-American criminal-justice system."" The opin-
ion, however, fails to recognize McCleskey's claim that the
disparities transcend any legitimate individualization because they
are based on impermissible racial factors.
Second, the majority avoids the most difficult part of the ques-
tion before the Court: the level at which the sentencing disparities
become constitutionally intolerable. The opinion admits the imper-
fections of our criminal justice system, but ignores the difference be-
tween mere imperfection and systemic racial bias. Instead, Justice
Powell simply concedes that human beings, and systems constructed
by human beings, cannot be perfect. Disparities and inconsistencies
exist. The inquiry is then at what level do the disparities exceed the
permissible vagaries of human endeavor. McCleskey makes no at-
tempt to define where this line exists, but finds that the evidence of
discrimination presented fails to bring the Georgia system over the
line into constitutionally impermissible territory. Thus, the Court
finds that the system is acceptable.
Here, of course, Amnesty disagrees. Amnesty concludes that "no
means of limiting the death penalty can prevent its being imposed
51. An insightful discussion of the tension between these goals is contained in State v.
Ramseur. 106 N.J. 123, 348-59, 524 A.2d 188, 303-08 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., dissenting).52. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 334-36 (1976); Sumner v. Shu-
man, 107 S. Ct. 2716, 2724-26 (1987).
53. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-89; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110-15;
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982).
54. 107 S. Ct. at 1772-73.
55. Id. at 1777 n.35.
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arbitrarily or unfairly."56 This statement is roughly equivalent to
Justice Powell's conclusion that disparities will inevitably exist in a
system that uses juries, judges and prosecutors.57 Yet, the inferences
drawn from this conclusion are precise opposites: Amnesty calls for
abolition, the Court opts for acceptance. The recognition of a level of
capriciousness, then, merely serves to bolster either position's reason-
ing. Simply, if capital punishment is a legitimate use of state power,
a level of imperfection in its implementation is, as in all human en-
deavors, a quality to be minimized but not reason to surrender. And,
if capital punishment is an illegitimate use of state power, any level
of arbitrary and discriminatory application is further evidence of its
unacceptability.
In the final passage of the McCleskey majority, however, we
find Justice Powell ironically echoing some of Amnesty's plea for the
people to re-involve themselves in the dialogue.
[M]cCleskey's arguments are best presented to the legislative
bodies. It is not the responsibility - or indeed even the right - of
this Court to determine the appropriateness of punishment for
particular crimes. It is the legislatures, the elected representa-
tives of the people, that are 'constituted to respond to the will
and consequently the moral values of the people.' 8
These comments represent more than judicial restraint in pass-
ing responsibility to the Legislature in a difficult case. For the Court,
and Justice Powell in particular, the remarks represent a certain
weary recognition that the Court's nearly twenty year struggle with
capital punishment - from McGautha v. California" to Furman6"
to Gregg6' to McCleskey" - has not resulted in a fair, responsible
and reliable system, but in one that, beneath its spruced up surface,
produces the tragic and capricious results documented in the Am-
nesty Report.
Thus, both the Amnesty Report and the Court reach the conclu-
sion that, if, as the problems in the current system suggest, some-
thing needs to be done about the death penalty in this country, it is
ultimately up to the people and their legislatures to act. The Court,
out of a weary recognition of its perceived limitations, and Amnesty,
56. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 5, at 189.
57. McClesky, 107 S. Ct. at 1775-77.
58. Id. at 1781 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
59. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
60. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
61. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
62. 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1976).
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out of a positive allegiance to moral principle, have called upon the
citizenry to address the realities of the system and confront the dis-
parities that it perpetuates.
McCleskey represents at least a temporary acceptance by the ju-
diciary, that the capriciousness and discrimination in death penalty
sentencing, chronicled by the Amnesty Report are an acceptable "im-
perfection" of our system. Whether these "imperfections" are accept-
able to the legislatures or the people remains an open question.

